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  Introduction  and  Summary 
  Over the last three years, the frontier market economies of sub-Saharan 
Africa have received growing amounts of portfolio capital ﬂ  ows.   1    During the 
2000s, sub-Saharan African frontier markets garnered growing interest from 
foreign investors, but heightened risk aversion from the Great Recession 
temporarily caused investors to retreat. Since 2010, continued positive 
macroeconomic performance, coupled with unprecedented accommodative 
monetary policies in advanced economies, renewed foreign investors’ interest 
on a much larger scale, resulting in sub-Saharan African frontier markets 
becoming more integrated with international capital markets. The number of 
sub-Saharan African countries with international credit ratings has increased, 
a large number of countries issued sovereign bonds—many of them for the 
ﬁ  rst time—and foreign investors have become active players in some domestic 
bond and equity markets. 
  Although these increased foreign capital inﬂ  ows may supplement domestic 
ﬁ  nancing of investment, they also pose challenges. Compared with foreign 
direct investment (FDI), portfolio capital ﬂ  ows and cross-border bank loans 
tend to be more volatile and more sensitive to changing conditions in global 
ﬁ  nancial markets. Although thus far, most sub-Saharan African frontier 
markets have largely escaped the turbulence in ﬁ  nancial markets suffered by 
emerging and developing countries in recent months, there is still the risk 
that, in the future, capital ﬂ  ow volatility may overwhelm relatively shallow 
ﬁ  nancial markets of sub-Saharan African frontier markets and test the 
capacity of macroeconomic policies to adjust. Therefore, it is important for 
these countries to have in place or strengthen frameworks so as to manage 
vulnerabilities to sudden reversals, should the related risks materialize. 
1 In this paper, a relatively wide definition of frontier markets for sub-Saharan Africa is adopted. Criteria used 
to select countries include recent growth dynamics and prospects, financial market development, general 
institutional conditions and evolution, and political conditions and perspectives. Although some of the countries 
are not included in investment bank indices, there has been sufficient foreign investor interest over the past 
five to ten years to warrant their consideration here. The list includes Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia (IMF, 2011a). MANAGING VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS
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  Against this background, this study examines the evolution of capital ﬂ  ows 
since 2010, in particular portfolio and cross-border bank ﬂ  ows in sub-
Saharan African frontier markets.   2    It discusses the macroeconomic policies 
and macroprudential policies that these countries have designed and/or 
implemented to reduce risks from the inherent volatility of these ﬂ  ows, and 
looks at how such policies might need to be strengthened as these countries 
become more integrated with the global ﬁ  nancial system. It also examines the 
appropriate role for capital ﬂ  ow measures (CFMs). 
  Our analysis suggests that sub-Saharan African frontier markets should 
strengthen policy frameworks to ensure that access to capital markets is 
beneﬁ  cial, speciﬁ  cally as these countries become more integrated with the 
global ﬁ  nancial system and there is a need to reduce vulnerabilities associated 
with capital ﬂ  ow surges and capital reversals in the short term as well as in the 
long term. Therefore, the following recommendations are provided for sub-
Saharan frontier markets economies: 
 •   Improve data.   The  ﬁ  rst step in being able to manage capital ﬂ  ows is to be 
able to monitor them effectively with data that are timely and of good 
quality. Article IV reports for most sub-Saharan African frontier markets 
have already highlighted the need to strengthen balance-of-payments data, 
including the coverage of cross-border private capital ﬂ  ows and stocks.   3   
 •   Enhance macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial policies.   Managing capital ﬂ  ows is more 
likely to be successful if it is supported by sound ﬁ  scal, monetary, and 
exchange rate policies and adequate ﬁ  scal and international reserve buffers. 
 •   Improve capacity to effectively use macroprudential policies.   In sub-Saharan 
African frontier markets, supervisory resources, including qualiﬁ  ed staff, 
the availability of high-frequency data, and analytical tools to assess 
systemic risks are limited and will need to be strengthened to ensure the 
effectiveness of macroprudential policies. 
 •   Exercise caution in the use of  capital ﬂ ow management measures.   The imposition 
of new CFMs could jeopardize further ﬁ  nancial sector deepening and 
thus should be considered as a temporary measure in the context of 
managing a crisis or near crisis situation (IMF, 2012).          
 2 IMF (2011a) examined capital flow developments in sub-Saharan Africa up to 2009. 
 3 A survey of the issues raised in the Article IV staff reports on the quality of data include (i) large net errors 
and omissions for the published balance of payments; (ii) data collection on transactions in nonresident 
securities is still a challenge; (iii) unreliable current/capital transfer split for foreign aid and no detailed data on 
the costs of embassies abroad; (iv) poor coverage of reinvested earnings; (v) data on outstanding debt stocks 
and principal payments are inconsistent; (vi) financial account is incomplete, as it does not record substantial 
transactions in assets; and (vii) flows and stocks of gross international reserves and net foreign assets position 
often require substantial adjustments.3
CHAPTER
  Short-Term Flows in Sub-Saharan African  
 Frontier  Markets 
  Nature and Characteristics of Capital Flows 
  Over the last decade, private capital ﬂ  ows to sub-Saharan Africa grew 
considerably. In the past, Africa had to rely heavily on ofﬁ  cial resources to 
ﬁ  nance balance-of-payments needs. Since 2010, however, easy global ﬁ  nancial 
conditions combined with sustained high growth and improved economic 
prospects led to a signiﬁ  cant increase in private capital inﬂ  ows to sub-Saharan 
African countries (    Figure 1         and   Box 1  ). Over the 2010–12 period, net private 
ﬂ  ows to sub-Saharan African countries doubled, from a low base, compared 
with the 2000–07 period; in the case of sub-Saharan African frontier markets, 
there has been a ﬁ  vefold increase. 
 1 
Figure 1. Capital Inflows1
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Notes: CEE = Central and Eastern Europe; CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States.
1 Capital inflows are defined as the aggregate of foreign direct investment, portfolio, and 
other liabilities. Category other includes liabilities to official creditors, foreign bank loans, 
and other financial transactions not covered in direct investment, portfolio investment, or 
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  Sub-Saharan African frontier markets were the main beneﬁ  ciaries of the recent 
surge in private capital ﬂ  ows. Although FDI contributed largely to this trend, 
portfolio and cross-border bank ﬂ  ows also increased (    Figure 2    ), surpassing 
the US$17 billion mark in 2012. Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia were the main 
beneﬁ  ciaries among sub-Saharan African frontier markets (    Table 1    ).   4    These 
countries recorded portfolio ﬂ  ows estimated at about 1.9 percent of GDP, 
2.7 percent of GDP, and 1.6 percent of GDP, respectively. For the other 
sub-Saharan African frontier markets, portfolio ﬂ  ows still remain quite small. 
Cross-border bank lending to sub-Saharan African frontier markets also rose 
(    Table 2    ), but net deposit positions remained stable for banks as deposits in 
foreign banks grew steadily (    Figure 3    ). 
  Box 1  . Drivers of Portfolio Flows to Sub-Saharan African Frontier Markets 
  Both push and pull factors contributed to the surge in portfolio private capital 
ﬂ  ows to sub-Saharan African frontier markets between 2011 and 2013:Q1 . 
Push factors include weak economic growth, excess liquidity, and low bond yields 
in advanced economies. Pull factors include the better economic prospects in sub-
Saharan African frontier markets. Improved macroeconomic policy management, low 
debt levels, and structural reforms, including related to the development of capital and 
securities markets, have encouraged foreign investment. Some factors, such as excess 
global liquidity, are cyclical; others, such as the positive potential growth differential 
between sub-Saharan African frontier markets and advanced economies, are structural 
and may persist. One important factor—investor risk aversion—is highly volatile, and 
can change abruptly in response to political as well as economic events. 
  An econometric analysis of the determinants of net portfolio ﬂ  ows in sub-
Saharan African frontier markets did not yield convincing results.   Although 
the global risk aversion variable (VIX) was negative, signiﬁ  cant, and robust across 
many model speciﬁ  cations, none of the other push or pull factors were statistically 
signiﬁ  cant—most likely because of a combination of factors, including poor data 
quality (see the Annex). 
    Table 1  . Examples of Factors Affecting Capital Flows 
Cyclical Structural
Push (from outside 
    sub-Saharan  Africa)
-    Interest rates in advanced 
economies
-  Global risk aversion
-    International portfolio diversification
-    Potential growth differential 
between advanced and sub-Saharan 
African frontier markets
Pull (inside sub- 
   Saharan  Africa)
- Commodity  prices
-  Domestic interest rates
- Domestic  inflation
-  Exchange rate stability
-  Fiscal and external balance sheets
-  Trade openness and other reforms
-  External capital account openness
4 For Senegal, IMF staff believes the official numbers to be unrealistically large.Short-Term Flows in Sub-Saharan African Frontier Markets
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   Although  portfolio  ﬂ  ows to sub-Saharan African frontier markets remain 
tiny compared with ﬂ  ows to other emerging and developing economies, 
their importance relative to country size is about equal. Over 2010–12, net 
portfolio ﬂ  ows to sub-Saharan African frontier markets still constitute a small 
share of total net portfolio ﬂ  ows to emerging and developing countries.  
    Figure 2  . Private Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa and Emerging Market 
 and  Developing  Economies    
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  2  The WEO follows the IMF’s   Balance of  Payments and     International Investment Position Manual,   fifth edition, in which  
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The category   Other   excludes liabilities to official creditors. MANAGING VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS
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  This share has, however, almost doubled compared to 2000–07. More 
importantly, over 2010–12, sub-Saharan African frontier markets’ net 
portfolio ﬂ  ows in terms of country gross domestic product outstripped those 
of emerging and developing economies (about 1.8 percent versus 0.9 percent 
for emerging and developing countries). 
    Since  June  2013,  capital  ﬂ  ows in emerging market economies became 
particularly volatile. Through mid-September 2013, following the 
announcement by the Federal Reserve chairman about the possible  
  tapering off of unconventional monetary policy, outﬂ  ows from emerging 
market mutual funds reached US$50 billion (3.9 percent of total), with 
    Table 1  . Sub-Saharan African Frontier Markets: Average Private Flows      
  (Average percent of GDP) 
Period Total FDI Portfolio1 Other2
Ghana 2000–07 −3.1 1.4 0.0 −4.5
2010–12 7.3 8.1 1.9 −2.7
Kenya 2000–07 1.9 1.2 −0.1 0.8
2010–12 8.2 2.3 0.0 6.0
Mauritius 2000–07 2.0 1.4 −0.6 1.2
2010–12 10.7 2.4 0.0 8.4
Mozambique 2000–07 8.2 4.8 −0.4 3.8
2010–12 23.8 23.8 0.0 0.1
Nigeria 2000–07 1.1 4.0 0.2 −3.0
2010–12 −2.5 2.5 2.7 −7.7
Senegal 2000–07 4.3 1.2 0.2 2.9
2010–12 3.0 2.0 3.5 −2.5
Tanzania 2000–07 4.7 3.9 0.0 0.7
2010–12 6.9 5.3 0.0 1.6
Uganda 2000–07 4.1 3.9 0.1 0.1
2010–12 7.2 5.4 0.3 1.5
Zambia 2000–07 9.9 6.4 0.3 3.2
2010–12 −5.6 5.0 1.6 −12.2
SSA - Frontier Markets 2000–07 2.0 3.3 0.1 −1.4
2010–12 2.2 4.2 1.8 −3.9
Other Emerging 
Market Economies
2000–07 2.0 2.2 −0.2 −0.1
2010–12 2.1 1.9 0.9 −0.7
  Source:  IMF,   World Economic Outlook  . 
Note: SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.
  1 Portfolio investment includes, in addition to equity securities and debt securities in the form of bonds and 
notes, money market instruments and financial derivatives such as options. 
  2 Other investment is a residual category that includes all financial transactions not covered in direct  
  investment, portfolio investment, or reserve assets, excluding liabilites to official creditors     Short-Term Flows in Sub-Saharan African Frontier Markets
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roughly US$23 billion coming from bond funds (    Figure 4    ). Although the 
June 2013 emerging market economy selloff was broad-based, the renewed 
volatility in August that followed some stabilization in July was more selective. 
Countries with weaker fundamentals such as Brazil, India, South Africa, and 
Turkey have experienced large depreciations and exchange rate volatilities 
(    Figures 5     and     6    )—measured as the percentage change in the exchange rates 
of their national currency versus the U.S. dollar—sharper declines in equities, 
greater widening of sovereign spreads and local bond yields, and generally 
greater outﬂ  ow from bond funds. 
    Figure 3  . Sub-Saharan African Frontier Markets External Loans from and  
 Deposits  at  BIS  -reporting  Banks     
(Billions of U.S. dollars)   
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  Source: Bank for International Settlement ( BIS), Locational Statistics. 
    Table 2  . Cross-Border Bank-related Flows to Sub-Saharan African Countries      
  (Billions U.S. dollars)  
Cross-Border Bank-Related Flows to SSA
Total Loans Loans to Nonbanks
2000–04 2010–12 2000–04 2010–12
SSA 50 109 39 51
SSA (excl. South Africa) 35 82 28 39
SSA Frontier Markets 8 36 6 25
Other SSA countries (excl. 
South Africa)
28 46 22 14
            Source: Bank for International Settlements, Locational Statistics.     
          Note: SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.MANAGING VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS
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    Most sub-Saharan African frontier markets have so far been largely unscathed 
by the current turmoil affecting emerging and developing economies. In 
aggregate terms, U.S. dollar–denominated debt of sub-Saharan African frontier  
  markets has not sold off as dramatically as that of the more liquid emerging 
and developing economies. Between May 22 and late August, the broader 
emerging market bond index (EMBIG) has declined by 8.5 percent, while 
the average frontier market bond price has declined by 5 percent (MCM, 
GMM, August 23). Similarly, sub-Saharan frontier markets’ currencies, with 
the exception of the Ghanaian cedi, have come under relatively little pressure 
compared to some emerging markets economies (    Figures 5     and     6    ). Some 
countries, however, such as Ghana and Tanzania, experienced widened bond 
spreads comparable to those of emerging markets (    Figure 7    ). 
    Figure 4  . Trends and Fluctuations in Equity and Bonds Flows to Sub-Saharan African Countries    
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    Figure 5  . Sub-Saharan African Frontier Markets versus Selected  
  Emerging Market and Developing Economies, Exchange Rate Depreciation  
    (    Percent change since January 2013  )   
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  1  EME is a weighted average of Brazil, India, South Africa, and Turkey exchange rates 
    Figure 6  . Sub-Saharan Africa versus Selected Emerging Market and Developing  
  Economies, Exchange Rate Volatility, 2013    
 ( Percent  change )   
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    Figure 7  . Sub-Saharan Africa Selected Economies, Government Bond Yield to Maturity 
Spreads to 10-year U.S. Bond, 2013   
 ( Basis  points )  
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  Box 2 .  Ghana’s Recent Experience in Portfolio Flows 
  Ghana attracted high and stable levels of foreign direct investment of about 8 percent 
of GDP, underpinned by the discovery and subsequent production of oil in 2011.      
  Oil-related foreign direct investment ﬂ  ows account for two-thirds of total foreign  
        The relatively muted impact on some sub-Saharan African frontier markets 
possibly is due to their liquidity level. Frontier markets represent a tiny 
fraction of the overall portfolio of dedicated emerging market investors and 
are very illiquid. So even when dedicated emerging market investors have 
needed liquidity, they may have been forced to sell the most liquid assets ﬁ  rst. 
Frontier positions tend to be retained for longer. However, in the event that 
foreign investors do liquidate their positions in such markets, the effect could 
amplify because there are not enough participants in the domestic market to 
substitute for the foreign investor. 
  Where liquidity conditions permitted, investors have differentiated among 
sub-Saharan African frontier markets based on their economic fundamentals. 
The more liquid sub-Saharan African frontier market currencies faced 
relatively more pressures in the second stage of the selloff (June 24–mid-
September) than in the ﬁ  rst stage of the selloff (May 22–June 21). Ghana (see 
  Box 2      ), which is facing rising inﬂ  ation pressures, deteriorating ﬁ  scal balance, 
and relatively low international reserves, has underperformed other frontier 
currencies in the period (see     Figures 5     and     6    ). In Nigeria, which is the only 
sub-Saharan African frontier market that is included in the major emerging 
market domestic government bond indices, the naira has come under some Short-Term Flows in Sub-Saharan African Frontier Markets
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  dir      ect     investment. At 2.8 percent of GDP in 2012, portfolio investments have increased 
in signiﬁ  cance. Portfolio inﬂ  ows are mostly in medium-term investments, as nonresidents 
are only allowed to purchase bonds with maturity of at least three years. Ghana sold 
in August 2013 a bond of US$1billion, with 10-year maturity at a yield of 8 percent. 
The yield was higher and the excess bids lower than in other African countries that 
issued Eurobonds earlier in the year, perhaps partly reﬂ  ecting the deteriorating ﬁ  nancial 
conditions. Ghana’s ﬁ  rst 10-year Eurobond was issued in 2007, which was four times 
oversubscribed and yielded as little as 4½ percent in April 2013. That bond had a yield 
of 8½ percent at issuance but in an environment of high international interest rates. 
 Although  portfolio  ﬂ  ows are supported by strong growth prospects, the above-
mentioned developments indicate sensitivity to deteriorating ﬁ  scal and current account 
deﬁ  cit positions of the country and global push factors, which caused emerging market 
bond turmoil in mid-2013. High domestic interest rates have sustained the interest of 
foreigners in the medium-term domestic market (about one-third of domestic debt is 
held by foreigners).  1   The increased participation of foreigners in the government debt 
markets could be an additional source of vulnerability resulting from rollover risks. 
Though the secondary market is rather illiquid, an early redemption or purchase of not 
yet matured three-year and ﬁ  ve-year bonds is possible. Although reserves have been 
kept roughly stable in recent months, they have fallen below estimates of the optimal 
reserve level in percent of imports in 2012.   
Box 2. (concluded)
    Figure 1  . Ghana: Domestic Government     Debt, by Holder  
  (Percent of total    )  
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  Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
 1  The average exchange rate depreciated by about 17 percent in the first half of 2012. Consequently, the 
Bank of Ghana took a number of measures in 2012 to tighten domestic liquidity. Although these measures 
were successful in stabilizing the currency, they came at the cost of double-digit real interest rates. MANAGING VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS
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pressure (see   Box 3  ). After May 22, the naira slightly depreciated (see      
  Figures 5     and     6    ), and there was an increase in government bond yields     (see 
    Figure 7    ). However, this pressure seems to have subsided; the authorities’ 
strategy to use their ample international reserves to keep the naira relatively 
stable and the strong outlook for oil prices have calmed investors thus far. 
  The relatively muted impacts in other sub-Saharan African frontier markets 
may not be sustained if the ﬁ  nancial turmoil affecting emerging markets 
persists. Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia seem to be the most exposed 
to shifts in foreign investor appetite for risky assets given their large current 
account deﬁ  cits and/or deteriorating ﬁ   scal  balance  (  Figure  8  ).    
  Box 3 .  Nigeria—Capital Flows and Policy Response 
  This box looks into capital ﬂ  ows developments, macroeconomic developments, and 
authorities’ policy response. 
  Gross private capital ﬂ  ows are estimated to have increased to US$12.3 billion in 2012 
(4.6 percent of GDP) from US$7.8 billion (3.4 percent of GDP) in 2010.
Disaggregated data from 2011 showed that the investment to the capital market 
accounted for 51 percent of total capital importation (foreign direct investment, 
portfolio investment    , and investments liabilities). 
  These developments contributed to a sharp increase in international reserves (from 
US$32 billion at end-2011 to US$49 billion at mid-March 2013) as authorities kept 
the naira-U.S. dollar exchange rate stable. Inﬂ  ows also induced declining government 
bond yields (    Figure 1    ) and funded government bond purchases. Inﬂ  ows also funded 
purchases of equities and private bonds, resulting in a sharp run-up in stock prices 
(    Figure 2    ) that exceeded the average increases in stock markets in emerging market 
economies or advanced economies. 
    Figure 1.   Nigeria: Bond Flows and Government Bond Yield    
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    Figure 8  . Sub-Saharan African Frontier Markets—Twin Deficit      
         ( Percent  of  GDP  ) 
   
NGA
ZMB
KEN
SEN
MUS
GHA
UGA TZA
MOZ
NGA
ZMB
KEN
SEN
MUS
GHA
UGA
TZA
MOZ
–30
–25
–20
–15
–10
–5
0
5
10
15
20
–12 –10 –8 –6 –4 –2 024
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
Government budget balance
2013 (Forecast)
2007
  Source:   IMF, World Economic Outlook  . 
  Recently, however, as investor sentiment toward emerging and developing markets has 
softened, the naira has weakened against the U.S. dollar, and the central bank announced  
  its intention to increase its foreign exchange intervention over the coming months to 
stabilize the currency. The Central Bank of Nigeria stepped up its defense of the naira 
during its biweekly foreign exchange auctions; however, the weakening of the naira and 
the slight decline during June to July of the Nigeria All Share Index may suggest a turn 
of investor’s sentiment. Also, EPFR data are showing some outﬂ  ows (Figure 4    ).    
    Figure 2  . Nigeria: Equity Flows and Stock Market Index     
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    Figure 9a  . Sub-Saharan Africa Frontier Markets—Portfolio  
  Flows and Government Bonds Yields     
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    Figure 9b  . Sub-Saharan Africa Frontier Markets—Portfolio  
  Flows and Stock Prices Index     
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  Macroeconomic Impact of Recent Portfolio Capital Flows 
  The surge in portfolio ﬂ  ows into some sub-Saharan African frontier markets 
over the 2011–13:Q1 period had important macroeconomic effects. With 
the exception of Nigeria, Kenya, and Mauritius, most portfolio inﬂ  ows may 
have contributed to expansionary ﬁ  scal policies (see     Figure 8    ). Inﬂ  ows also 
generally induced declining government bond yields (    Figures 9a     and     9b    ), Short-Term Flows in Sub-Saharan African Frontier Markets
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and funded government bond purchases. In Nigeria and Kenya, inﬂ  ows also 
funded purchases of equities and private bonds, resulting in a sharp run-up in 
stock prices that exceeded the average increases in stock markets in emerging 
market economies or advanced economies (see   Box 3  ). In some countries, 
capital inﬂ  ows, in the form of cross-border bank loans, fueled credit growth 
(for example, Mauritius). However, in general, private credit growth in sub-
Saharan African frontier markets remained broadly in line with nominal 
growth of gross domestic product. 
    Policymakers in sub-Saharan African frontier markets used part of 
these capital inﬂ  ows to rebuild international reserves and prevent large 
appreciations in their currencies (    Figure 10        ). In Nigeria, reserves jumped 
from 5 months of imports to 6.8 months of imports, between end-2011 
and 2013:Q1, while the naira appreciated slightly by about 3 percent against 
the U.S. dollar during that period. In some countries, central banks were 
confronted with the task of ensuring that the increase in liquidity arising from 
the capital inﬂ  ows did not subvert their inﬂ  ation and other monetary policy 
objectives. Thus, in Nigeria, although policy rates were kept unchanged, the 
authorities raised the cash reserve requirement. In a number of countries, 
central banks also needed to step up open market operations to sterilize the 
capital inﬂ  ows. However, in light of concerns about large sterilization costs 
and/or weak central bank capital positions, Zambia ( Box 4) and Mauritius at 
times allowed the buildup of large excess liquidity.     
Figure 10. Sub-Saharan Africa Frontier Markets: 
Net Portfolio Flows and Gross International Reserves 
(Billions of U.S. dollars)
Net por olio cumula ve
ﬂows-SSA FM 
Int. reserves (rhs)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
–5
0
5
10
15
20
25
2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, and International Financial Statistics.MANAGING VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS
16
  Box 4  . Zambia—Copper and Capital
After a sharp drop in 2009, capital ﬂ  ows increased, primarily led by foreign direct 
investment inﬂ  ows in the mining sector, from US$0.4 billion in 2009 to US$1 billion 
(5 percent of GDP) in 2012. Foreign direct investment ﬂ  ows have responded to rising 
copper prices but also to Zambia’s relatively favorable business environment, compared 
with other countries in the region. In September 2012, Zambia issued successfully its 
ﬁ  rst sovereign Eurobond (10-year dollar-denominated bullet bond of US$750 million). 
Moreover, foreign investment in government securities in the domestic market picked 
up in mid-2012 with foreign holdings amounting to US$250 million in May 2013 
(about 10 percent of Zambia’s international reserves), increasing foreign holdings of 
government securities within one year maturity from 2½ percent to about 8 percent. 
Equity ﬂ  ows remain small.
The bulk of the increase in foreign investment in government securities in the 
domestic market has been in shorter-term treasury bills. These ﬂ  ows are driven by 
investors’ search for yield and increased risk appetite. Higher interest rates on Zambian 
government securities since September 2012 paired with a relatively stable exchange 
rate underpinned investors’ interest in the absence of signiﬁ  cant controls on banking 
and portfolio ﬂ  ows. Owing to the still limited size of short-term ﬂ  ows, no policies have 
been taken in response to the recent capital inﬂ  ows. However, the Bank of Zambia has 
demonstrated its willingness to act when it introduced during the global ﬁ  nancial crisis 
a limit on foreigners’ short-term borrowing in local currency.
  Table 1  . Government Bond Issues
Date Issuer Rating Size (US$ mil.) Maturity (Years) Coupon (%) Yield at Issue (%)
Oct-11 Namibia BBB−    500 10 5.5 5.835
Sep-12 Zambia B+    750 10 5.375 5.625
May-13 Rwanda B    400 10 6.625 6.875
Jul-13 Nigeria BB−    500 10 6.375 6.625
Aug-13 Ghana B+ 1,000 10 7.875 8
Dec-13 Gabon BB− 1,500 10 6.375 6.47717
CHAPTER
  Policy Responses to Capital Flows 
in Sub-Saharan Frontier Markets 
  Managing volatile capital ﬂ  ows has not yet created major policy challenges 
in most sub-Saharan African frontier markets. Looking ahead, however, 
given the trend toward deeper integration with global ﬁ  nancial markets, sub-
Saharan African frontier markets are likely to become increasingly vulnerable 
to global ﬁ  nancial shocks. In that context, a key emerging lesson is the 
need for coherent macroeconomic frameworks that are credible and well 
communicated. Experience in the more troubled countries and discussions 
of expected Federal Reserve tapering     with sub-Saharan central banks 
in East Africa highlight the need for clarity in the monetary framework, 
avoiding loose talk on the imposition of capital controls, which may lead to 
deteriorating conﬁ  dence and worsen the situation. 
  How prepared are sub-Saharan African frontier markets to handle the 
consequences of increased integration with global capital markets? Managing 
volatile capital ﬂ  ows typically requires a combination of (i) macroeconomic 
policies, which should be primary adjustment policies; (ii) macroprudential 
policies, prudential tools designed to limit systemic ﬁ  nancial risk; and  
 (iii)  capital  ﬂ  ow measures (CFMs), which should not be substitute for policy 
adjustment, but could play a temporary role, buying time to implement more 
fundamental adjustment. The speciﬁ  c policy mix depends, among others 
factors, on existing macroeconomic conditions, the quality of domestic 
prudential regulation, and related institutional development. 
 Macroeconomic  Policies 
  Whenever possible, macroeconomic policies should be the primary 
instruments used to minimize any undesirable macroeconomic effects 
from volatile capital ﬂ  ows (IMF, 2013c). However, ensuring maximum 
macroeconomic policy ﬂ  exibility requires the maintenance of overall 
macroeconomic stability along with adequate buffers. These conditions 
are typically not always present and hence the recommended mix of 
  2  MANAGING VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS
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macroeconomic policies is likely to differ across countries. In particular, 
some sub-Saharan African frontier markets exhibit areas of macroeconomic 
vulnerability with limited depth of ﬁ  nancial and credit markets, constraining 
their monetary policy options. In addition, timely policy implementation is 
critical, with adequate and timely data on sources and types of capital ﬂ  ows 
and on other macroeconomic indicators. In this context, sub-Saharan African 
frontier markets will need to invest in building their capacity to collect and 
analyze data on capital ﬂ  ows and, more generally, capital and ﬁ  nancial accounts 
of the balance of payments as well as asset prices, particularly real estate prices. 
  In considering an appropriate policy response for a given country, several 
factors must be taken into account. These include (i) a current assessment 
of the exchange rate and competitiveness; (ii) analysis of foreign exchange 
reserve adequacy—both in terms of import cover and in terms of short-term 
debt and other liabilities cover—and also of the alignment of the exchange 
rate with fundamentals   5    (    Table 3    ); (iii) the cyclical position of a country, 
including its output gap and the extent of inﬂ  ation pressures; (iv) the extent 
of risks for asset bubbles; and (v) the balance sheet conditions of banks, 
corporate entities, and ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. Thus, for example, Nigeria, 
on the one hand, with a healthy international reserve buffer and a currency 
5 With a few exceptions, the real exchange rates in frontier markets have remained aligned with fundamentals 
despite the surge in capital inflows. Until end-2012, only Ghana seems to have an overvalued exchange rate 
while no other appreciation pressures are recorded for the rest of sub-Saharan African frontier markets 
economies. Moreover, real exchange rates weakened recently in most of the frontier markets countries. 
  Table 3  . Real Exchange and International Reserves Performance   
Country
2012 Exchange Rate 
Assessment
End-2012 Reserves Months 
of Imports
Ghana + 2.8
Kenya 0 3.8
Mauritius 0 4.3
Mozambique 0 3.3
Nigeria 0 5.7
Senegal  1  0 5.2
Tanzania 0 3.4
Uganda 0 4.2
Zambia 0 3.3
Source: IMF, African Department database and country staff reports.
Note: + overvaluation of national currency, 0 means real exchange real 
aligned with economic fundamentals.
 1   West African Economic and Monetary Union reserves in months of imports 
excluding intraregional trade.Policy Responses to Capital Flows in Sub-Saharan Frontier Markets
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generally in line with fundamentals, can choose to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market as part of its strategy to manage capital outﬂ  ows caused by 
a perceived temporary episode of global risk aversion (IMF, 2012). Its robust 
economic growth and still high inﬂ  ation also suggests that some tightening 
of monetary conditions might also be employed. On the other hand, Ghana, 
with much lower reserves, and large ﬁ  scal and current account deﬁ  cits, 
would need to allow its currency to adjust, while also substantially tightening 
monetary and ﬁ  scal policies to attenuate the capital outﬂ  ow and reduce its 
need for foreign ﬁ  nancing, respectively (IMF, 2013a).      
 Macroprudential  Measures 
  Apart from complicating macroeconomic management, volatile capital ﬂ  ows 
may increase ﬁ  nancial system risks. Capital inﬂ  ow surges may jeopardize banking 
system stability if they facilitate excessive credit growth by banks or foster asset/
liability currency mismatches. Surges might also fuel asset price bubbles (for 
example, in real estate or in the equities market). The Nigerian banking crisis of 
2009 was, in part, fueled by foreign borrowing by banks, the proceeds of which 
were used to invest in the stock market. When the stock market bubble burst,  
  a number of banks became insolvent. Therefore, there is also an important role 
for macroprudential policies to play in managing capital ﬂ  ows. 
  While macroeconomic policies can limit the adverse impact of volatile capital 
ﬂ  ows, they cannot completely insulate sub-Saharan African frontier markets 
from major global ﬁ  nancial shocks. To limit negative spillovers, policies 
that promote sound and stable domestic ﬁ  nancial systems are important. 
Healthy local banking systems would provide a buffer as they did after the 
global ﬁ  nancial crisis. In this context, reported capital adequacy ratios exceed 
regulatory norms in most sub-Saharan African frontier markets, whereas 
recognized nonperforming loans are relatively low compared with other 
low-income countries. Nevertheless, as sub-Saharan African frontier markets 
become more integrated into the global ﬁ  nancial system, it will be important 
for policymakers and supervisors to better tailor prudential regulations to 
address systemic risks arising from such integration and build capacity to 
monitor and assess risks associated with cross-border activities. 
  Macroprudential instruments can be grouped in three broad categories: 
(i) tools to address threats from excessive credit expansion in the system 
(countercyclical capital requirements, dynamic provisioning, increased risk 
weights); (ii) tools to address key implications of systemic ﬁ  nancial risk (caps 
on foreign currency lending, limits on maturity mismatches, limits on net open 
currency positions); and (iii) tools to mitigate structural vulnerabilities and 
limit spillovers from banking stress (bank resolution requirements, disclosures 
for markets and institutions targeting systemic risks). MANAGING VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS
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  Sub-Saharan African frontier markets have started to adopt macroprudential 
measures in varying degrees (see   Box 5  ). In Nigeria, the authorities recently 
reviewed the risk weights on certain industry exposures in the computation of 
the capital adequacy ratio and have also limited bank investments in the stock 
market. In Uganda, currently the authorities are designing contingency plans to 
    Box 5  . Capital Flows Management Measures in Sub-Saharan African Frontier Markets 
  The type and extent of capital ﬂ  ows management measures have varied widely, 
reﬂ  ecting countries’ speciﬁ  c circumstances. The following types of measures are used: 
  Measures aimed at managing capital inﬂ  ows: 
  Restrictions on nonresident purchase of  government securities: Only one of the region’s frontier 
market economy countries applies restrictions on all purchase of government securities by 
nonresidents (Tanzania); another restricts only purchases of government securities of less 
than three years (Ghana); and two others (Nigeria and Kenya) apply selective restrictions on 
nonresident purchases of securities. 
  Maximum total primary issuance of  bonds held by nonresidents:   Zimbabwe imposes a maximum cap of 
35 percent. 
  Maximum total share of  national companies held by nonresidents:   Three countries apply these types of 
measures: Kenya (60 percent), Tanzania (60 percent), and Zimbabwe (35 percent at primary 
issuance, and approval required for participation in the secondary market). 
  Maximum on share purchased by individual investors:   In Tanzania, individual investors may not acquire 
more than 1 percent of an issue and institutional investors no more than 10 percent. 
  Minimum holding period:   In Tanzania, there is a minimum holding period of three months for all 
shares and securities purchased locally by nonresidents. 
  Limits to direct or indirect foreign exchange exposure:   In Tanzania, owing to regulations of the Bank of 
Tanzania (October 2011), banks are no longer able to enter into swaps or forward sales with 
nonresidents, and even spot transactions in foreign exchange have to reﬂ  ect an economic 
interest. In Kenya, swaps are restricted to maturities longer than one month. 
  Approval required prior to capital transactions with nonresidents:   In Mozambique, all transactions with 
nonresidents require approval by the central bank. Zimbabwe requires approval from the 
Exchange Control to invest new inﬂ  ows of funds in money market instruments. 
  Measures aimed at managing capital outﬂ  ows: 
  Approval prior to transaction:   In one of the frontier market economies (Senegal), approval by the 
Ministry of Finance is required for virtually all capital outﬂ  ows except for amortization of 
debt and repayments of short-term loans. As mentioned before, by limiting outﬂ  ows, this 
policy may also discourage capital inﬂ  ows. 
  R  equest of  accounting and/or tax records: Two countries—Tanzania and Zambia—request 
presentation of audited accounts and/or compliance with tax obligations for the repatriation 
of capital and associated income. Policy Responses to Capital Flows in Sub-Saharan Frontier Markets
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deal with excessive inﬂ  ows through macroprudential means. However, in sub-
Saharan African frontier markets, where ﬁ  nancial systems are becoming more 
complex, effective macroprudential measure policies will require the authorities 
to strengthen technical capacity and improve information. For example, in 
these economies, as in emerging and developing economies, nonbank ﬁ  nancial 
institutions (such as pension funds and insurance companies) are becoming 
systemically important, and nonbank ﬁ  nancial institutions can account for 
a signiﬁ  cant share of the ﬁ  nancial system’s total assets, and be a source 
of funding to banks. Linkages among ﬁ  nancial institutions are increasing 
and becoming more complex; ﬁ  nancial institutions are becoming more 
integrated with the global economy, and cross-border banking activities are 
growing rapidly. However, supervisory processes have traditionally focused 
on compliance to regulations for individual banks instead of monitoring 
systemic risks. In addition, supervisory resources, including qualiﬁ  ed staff 
and availability of analytical tools, are limited (Beck, Maimbo, Faye, and Triki, 
2011). And limited high-frequency data on the concentration of risks within 
the system limit the efﬁ  cient monitoring of systemic vulnerabilities. 
  Strengthening supervisory capabilities for an enhanced use of 
macroprudential policies would require the following: (i) developing  
  ways to monitor a risk buildup; (ii) setting in place indicators and analytical  
  tools to detect when risks are about to materialize; and (iii) using 
macroprudential tools in a timely manner (IMF, 2011b). For instance, the 
recent Financial Sector Assessment Program for Nigeria recommended that 
the authorities continue to strengthen consolidated supervision of ﬁ  nancial 
entities and improve capacity for cross-border supervision, given the increase 
in cross-border operations of Nigerian and regional banks. Mauritius also 
recently started joint supervisory exercises for important ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
and improved signiﬁ  cantly the coverage and quality of its balance-of-
payments statistics, better capturing ﬂ  ows related to the offshore banking 
sector. Although a number of countries have developed high-frequency 
indicators of economic activity as part of an exercise in improving their 
monetary policy frameworks, similar data and reporting requirements on 
capital ﬂ  ows characteristics (for example, origin, destination, and type 
of investment, maturity, and so on), which would be essential for close 
monitoring and analysis of emerging risks, are largely absent.   6   
  Indeed, in certain circumstances, attempts to apply more sophisticated 
macroprudential measures in limited capacity settings may even backﬁ  re.  
 6 In the 2012 Article IV consultation (IMF, 2012), the Nigerian authorities indicated that they were mindful of 
the risk of capital flow reversals and thus were closely monitoring the surge in inflows, especially by keeping 
track of the maturity distribution of the securities that were being purchased. MANAGING VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS
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  For example, employing countercyclical capital provisioning requirement in 
the absence of high-frequency data, or a countercyclical limit on banks’ net 
open foreign exchange positions in the absence of timely and high-quality 
data on the type and maturity of banks’ foreign exchange assets and liabilities 
could amplify business cycles and create foreign exchange liquidity crunches 
that negatively affect bank stability. 
  Capital Flow Management Measures 
  In the context of the recent capital inﬂ  ows period, the IMF has revisited the 
toolkit for addressing the risks from surges in capital ﬂ  ow. In its “institutional 
view” (IMF, 2013b), the IMF notes that in certain circumstances CFMs 
can play a complementary role in supporting macroeconomic adjustment 
and safeguarding ﬁ  nancial stability. In particular, CFMs may be temporarily 
appropriate if the room for adjusting monetary, ﬁ  scal, and exchange rate 
policies is constrained—either through limited macroeconomic space or 
possible destabilizing balance sheet effects in the ﬁ  nancial sector. CFMs may 
also buy time in cases where policy adjustments take time to implement. 
However, CFMs should be temporary and not substitute for necessary 
macroeconomic adjustment or ﬁ  nancial stability measures. 
  Most sub-Saharan African countries have only partially liberalized their capital 
accounts, and remaining restrictions may impact on capital ﬂ  ows even though 
they were not designed for that purpose (see   Box 6  ). Measures in place in 
frontier markets include residency-based or currency-based limits (tax or 
regulation) on capital ﬂ  ows. For example, in Tanzania, nonresident purchases 
of domestic treasury securities are not permitted, whereas in Ghana and 
Kenya, there are restrictions limiting nonresident purchases of government 
securities to longer maturity instruments. Restrictions on outﬂ  ows also exist 
and generally also pre-date the 2008–09 global crisis. While outﬂ  ow CFMs 
on nonresidents are typically less onerous than those on residents, this is 
not always the case. In Senegal, for example, most capital outﬂ  ows would 
require approval prior to transactions with nonresidents. In Tanzania, there 
is a minimum holding period of three months for all equity shares purchased 
locally by nonresidents. 
  In the context of a restrictive capital account framework, the use of additional 
CFMs for capital account management may be more difﬁ  cult than otherwise. 
With an already complex regulatory framework, additional measures may 
have negative feedback effects on investor conﬁ  dence. When faced with a 
surge of capital ﬂ  ows, frontier markets may therefore want to be mindful 
of potential drawbacks, and carefully assess the costs and beneﬁ  ts of CFMs. 
Costs could include damaging effects on future inﬂ  ows and reputational risks 
for the country’s investment environment. These potential drawbacks will Policy Responses to Capital Flows in Sub-Saharan Frontier Markets
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be particularly large in the case where a CFM would limit capital outﬂ  ows.   7   
Hence for those frontier markets with a reputation for a relatively open capital 
account (for example, Nigeria and Mauritius) and other sub-Saharan African 
frontier markets seeking to build such a reputation, the costs of introducing 
new CFMs may be relatively high. 
  However, even when CFMs may be desirable, implementation issues arise. 
Effectiveness will depend on country-speciﬁ  c policy frameworks and 
institutional settings. In sub-Saharan African frontier markets with relatively 
unsophisticated ﬁ  nancial market structures, controls may in fact be more 
effective than in more developed ﬁ  nancial markets, where complex ﬁ  nancial 
instruments might make it easier to circumvent controls. At the same time, 
institutional capacity and information constraints in frontier markets will 
generally prevent effective monitoring and enforcement of capital restrictions, 
hence strongly undermine the likely effectiveness of CFMs. 
 7 For example, the temptation to use restrictions on bank deposits in low-capacity settings as tools to control 
capital outflows would not be advisable, as they can severely disrupt economic activity, confidence in the 
financial system, and prospects for financial deepening. 
    Box 6  . Examples of Macroprudential Policies     
Country Macroprudential Policies
Ghana In 2009
-    Foreign and local currency deposits are subject to a 9 percent reserve requirement in 
domestic currency.
-    Reserve balance must be held with the Bank of Ghana.
-    Daily single foreign currency exposure limit was reduced from 15 to 10 percent of the 
capital base.
Kenya -    Capital requirements are relatively high to prepare banks for overall risks.
-    Households do not borrow in foreign currency, except for a small segment of the 
mortgage market.
Mozambique -    The limited impact of private capital inflows on the overall liquidity conditions has not 
called for specific macroprudential measures.
Nigeria -      Exposure to a particular industry within a sector is in excess of 20 percent of total 
credit facilities of a bank the risk weight of the entire portfolio in that industry shall be 
150 percent.
Senegal -    No traditional macroprudential regulations have been employed.
Tanzania -    In late 2011 net open position on foreign exchange was reduced.
Uganda -    Ongoing design of contingency plans to deal with excessive inflows through 
macroprudential means.
Source: Country authorities.MANAGING VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS
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 8 At times, CFMs and macroprudential measures may overlap. Policy tools could be seen as both a CFM and a 
macroprudential policy. For example, a restriction on banks’ foreign borrowing through a levy on bank foreign 
exchange inflows or required reserve on banks’ foreign exchange liabilities would aim to limit capital inflows 
or slow domestic credit. In any way, these policies should be seen as supporting effective supervision and 
complementing appropriate sound macroeconomic policies (IMF, 2013b).
  Both the impact on the investment climate and implantation constraints argue 
for only very restricted use of the CFM   8    as a tool in SSA frontier markets. 
It is generally recommended that any new CFMs should be temporary, 
and scaled back when the capital ﬂ  ow pressures abate. In addition, CFMs 
should avoid leading to external payments arrears or default particularly in 
sovereign debt, which could undermine relations with creditors and damage 
the international trade and payments system. In crisis or near crisis situations, 
there could be a temporary role for introducing CFMs on outﬂ  ows as part of 
a broader policy package to address the underlying cause of the crisis.         25
 Conclusions 
  In the past three years, foreign portfolio ﬂ  ows to sub-Saharan Africa have 
grown considerably. Sub-Saharan African frontier markets were the main 
beneﬁ  ciaries, and, for the most part, the current bout of global ﬁ  nancial 
market turbulence has so far left most of these countries relatively unscathed. 
For those countries left unscathed, this, in part, reﬂ  ects their relatively illiquid 
ﬁ  nancial markets but also their still strong fundamentals and prospects. 
However, this muted impact may not be sustained, and risks of contagion and 
possible reversals remain if the global turmoil persists. Looking ahead, given 
the clear trend toward their deeper integration with global ﬁ  nancial markets, 
sub-Saharan African frontier markets are likely to become increasingly 
vulnerable to global ﬁ  nancial shocks. The appropriate combination of policies 
for addressing these risks would depend on country circumstances, and the 
toolkit would need to include macroeconomic and prudential policies. In that 
context, the following will need to be strengthened: 
 •   Improving data.   A recurring theme of this chapter is the need to improve 
data quality and timeliness. In a number of countries, the ofﬁ  cial data 
on private capital portfolio ﬂ  ows and stocks are based on defective 
surveys that may suffer from only partial coverage (for example, omitting 
nonbanks) or poor quality (for example, inadequate validation of 
transactions reported by banks). Article IV staff reports for most sub-
Saharan African frontier markets have highlighted the need to strengthen 
balance-of-payments data, including the coverage of cross-border private 
capital ﬂ  ows and stocks. 
 •   Enhancing macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial policies.   Managing capital ﬂ  ows is 
more likely to be successful if it is supported by sound ﬁ  scal, monetary, 
and exchange rate policies and adequate ﬁ  scal and international reserve 
buffers. This would allow more policy room to mitigate any negative 
macroeconomic effects of capital ﬂ  ow surges or reversals, as has been 
seen in the case of Nigeria thus far. In addition, in the current episode 
of global ﬁ  nancial market turbulence, investors have tended to punish MANAGING VOLATILE CAPITAL FLOWS
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more those countries—including among sub-Saharan African frontier 
markets—with the worse economic fundamentals. 
 •   Improving capacity to effectively use macroprudential policies.   Macroprudential 
measures are important to prevent the buildup of systemic ﬁ  nancial 
sector risks that may arise from volatile capital ﬂ  ows. Sub-Saharan 
African frontier markets have implemented various such measures, 
such as limits on banks’ open foreign exchange positions. However, 
ensuring the effectiveness of macroprudential policies requires progress 
in developing ways to monitor a systemic risk buildup and using 
macroprudential tools in a timely manner. In sub-Saharan African 
frontier markets, supervisory resources, including qualiﬁ  ed staff, the 
availability of high-frequency data, and analytical tools to assess systemic 
risks are limited and will need to be strengthened. 
 •   Improving the toolkit of  capital ﬂ  ow management measures.   The IMF has indicated 
that, when the room for adjusting macroeconomic policies is limited, 
capital ﬂ  ow measures (CFMs) may be considered to temper volatile ﬂ  ows. 
In the case of sub-Saharan African frontier markets, however, effective 
implementation would require signiﬁ  cant improvements in institutional 
capacity to monitor ﬂ  ows and enforce regulations, given the often porous 
nature of existing capital controls. More importantly, the imposition of 
new CFMs, especially on outﬂ  ows, would require evaluating possible 
negative effects on future inﬂ  ows, such as the damage to further ﬁ  nancial 
sector deepening and improved relations with international investors. In 
this context, any new CFMs on outﬂ  ows should be considered only as a 
last resort in response to ﬁ  nancial crisis situations. 27
      Annex:   Econometric Analysis of Drivers of Portfolio Flows 
to Sub-Saharan African Frontier Markets 
  The regressions reported in   Table A.1   are run on an annual panel data 
covering the period 1991–2012 for selected emerging and frontier markets. 
The dependent variable is deﬁ  ned as the ratio of portfolio liabilities 
(nonresident purchases of domestic assets net of sales) to GDP. The use of 
lagged regressors helps to minimize potential of endogeneity. The regression 
includes variables aimed to capture push factors such as the U.S. Treasury 
bill interest rates, and global risk (VIX), as well as several pull factors such as 
the inﬂ  ation level, ﬁ  scal balance, gross public debt, output growth, change 
in reserves, and the stock market development. A stepwise approach was 
employed to explore the signiﬁ  cance of alternative pull variables (many of 
them are likely collinear). Random effects were used to allow the inclusion of 
a dummy for sub-Saharan African frontier markets. Running the regressions 
for sub-Saharan African frontier markets alone produced no statistically 
signiﬁ  cant relationships, likely because of poor data quality and the small size 
of the sample. 
    Another set of regressions focusing on sub-Saharan African frontier markets 
was run using quarterly data and disaggregating portfolio ﬂ  ows in equity 
and bonds ﬂ  ows (  Table A.2  ). The dependent variables are based on EPFR 
data, deﬁ  ned for each country as the ﬂ  ows into equity and bond funds of 
the country, divided by the stock at the beginning of the quarter. A crisis 
dummy is equal to 1 from 2008:Q4 onward. The estimation is limited by the 
fact that most pull factors are not available on a quarterly basis. Quarterly 
output growth was only available for three countries in the sample. Ghana 
and Nigeria were selected as a subsample because these countries have 
experienced larger portfolio inﬂ  ows.     
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    Table A.2  . Determinants of Equity and Bond Flows in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Portfolio Equities Bonds
Sub- 
Saharan 
Africa
Nigeria 
and Ghana
Sub- 
Saharan 
Africa
Nigeria 
and Ghana
Sub- 
Saharan 
Africa
Nigeria 
and Ghana
VIX *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Crisis dummy *** ***  *** ***
Output growth 
Constant *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
  R -squared 0.22 0.27 0.29 0.34 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.30 0.17 0.20 0.29
Countries 5 5 2 2 11 11 2 2 5 2 2
Observations 126 126 53 53 478 478 92 47 160 66 60
  Source  : IMF staff calculations. 
   Notes:  (,) indicate the sign of the coefficient, ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.    
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